As I’ve previously indicated in these pages, when considering whether a Presidential nominee should be confirmed by the Senate, I follow a pretty simple two-factor analysis (which, admittedly, is ne’er followed in the current hyper-partisan environment):  Is the nominee objectively qualified for the position?  If so, is there any other objective factor that should nonetheless disqualify him/her from the position for which s/he has been nominated (e.g., prior criminal conviction, demonstrated drug abuse problem, etc.)?  Since the Constitution provides our President the power to nominate whom s/he considers appropriate, I don’t believe that a nominee’s subjective leanings (e.g., whether s/he supports or opposes abortion rights, whether s/he is too soft or too hardline in foreign policy) should be part of the equation.  Accordingly, I believe that Judge Garland should not only have received a hearing, but – absent unreported information coming to light – should also have been confirmed by the Senate, and that it was appropriate that Judge Gorsuch and Secretary of State Pompeo received confirmation.

That said, one of the many reasons that I’m glad that I’m not a sitting Senator is that if I was, I would have to consider whether to vote to confirm Gina Haspel as CIA Director.

Ms. Haspel easily passes the first hurdle; she’s been called the most qualified nominee to head the CIA in the Agency’s history, and has received what USA Today has referred to as “glowing accolades” from former Agency directors that have served in both parties’ administrations.  However, Ms. Haspel’s nomination is the rare one that seems – at least for me – to require careful reflection as to whether the appointment should be rejected due to an “other objective factor” as I used the phrase above.  It’s undisputed that Ms. Haspel ran a CIA “black site” that conducted waterboarding in the wake of 9/11; that she thereafter participated in the destruction of videotapes of questionable interrogations (although she was cleared of inappropriate behavior by a subsequent internal CIA inquiry); and that although she has testified that she supports the Congressional ban on and pledged not to conduct the kinds of activities that she and the CIA conducted after 9/11, she didn’t explicitly characterize those activities as immoral.  Given her record, does Ms. Haspel possess the appropriate moral compass to serve in the position that – along with the presidency itself – is arguably the most consistently subject to the harshest morally conflicting pressures?

It has been widely reported that Sen. John McCain, notwithstanding his warm words for Ms. Haspel’s service to our country over the past three decades, considers Ms. Haspel’s unwillingness to call the CIA’s activities immoral “disqualifying” for the CIA directorship.

I have the deepest respect for Mr. McCain in the realm of foreign affairs.  His sentiments, given his own experience as a POW, are understandable.  At the same time, former CIA Director Michael Hayden, in his book, The Assault on Intelligence, called Ms. Haspel’s earlier selection for the Agency’s Deputy Director under Mr. Pompeo an “inspired choice” due to the high regard Ms. Haspel enjoys among CIA personnel.  Mr. Hayden – who makes clear in his book that he is no admirer of President Trump – argues that those (which would include him) that played a part in the government’s “electronic surveillance, metadata collection, renditions, detentions, interrogations, and targeted killings” have a greater sensitivity to lines that should not be crossed than those that didn’t have to face the moral questions implicit in the conduct of such activities.  It’s a point – although one readily subject to skepticism.

I am less concerned about Ms. Haspel’s unwillingness to condemn the CIA’s past activities, given her pledge not to carry on such activities during her directorship.  I consider it a manner of establishing leadership.  I agree with a premise advanced by others that one does not build esprit de corps in an organization that one intends to lead by trashing the group – particularly if one’s comments, given one’s record, are certain to be viewed by the organization as hypocritical means to advance one’s own career.  Interestingly, Mr. Hayden also states that he viewed Ms. Haspel’s appointment as Deputy Director to be “pitch perfect” because it meant neither a repeat nor repudiation of the Agency’s past.

At the same time, I am concerned with her acknowledged participation in the destruction of the interrogation videotapes.  Can she be trusted?  The only responses I’ve seen to these concerns are that she was following orders (so were Nazi enablers) and was found blameless for the inappropriate operation in the subsequent CIA inquiry (perhaps a whitewash for a loyal and diligent employee).  I’m not sure that these would be sufficient responses for me under many circumstances, although I balance this unease against the ringing affirmations of both Leon Panetta and Mr. Hayden that Ms. Haspel will be willing to “speak truth to power” if required to do so in her interactions with the President.

After all of this “on the one hand, on the other hand” (sounding more than a bit like Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof):  I reluctantly support Ms. Haspel’s nomination.  My reasons are many, albeit all simple:  the confidence of former Directors that she will speak truth to a President who, in my opinion, has insufficient respect for the rule of law; her undisputed qualifications and knowledge of the Agency; her willingness, based upon past experience, to disavow any return to the activities that she engaged in post-9/11; her steadfastness in being unwilling to cast aspersions upon the CIA’s post-9/11 activities to further her own career; the high regard that the professionals in a vital, but now beleaguered, part of our national defense have for her; the fact that almost anyone that the President nominates in her stead will probably be less qualified, have less respect for and from the Agency, and be more prone to Presidential pressure; and the fact that we, frankly, need someone tough to lead the CIA.  We confront bad state and non-state actors across the globe.  Although most of us live in an ivory tower, the fact remains [now, sounding like Jack Nicholson’s Col. Nathan Jessup in A Few Good Men  😉 ]:  we need someone who is willing to fight to protect our ivory tower in places and ways that we don’t go to or know about.  Although there is no one alive I respect more than Pope Francis, he wouldn’t be a good fit for the CIA Directorship.  Ms. Haspel is.

I concede that there is more than an element of faith in the expectation that someone that admittedly participated in activities many call torture and in the destruction of videotapes of inappropriate interrogations will be the speaker of truth, guardian of appropriate interrogation practices, and the protector of the rule of law.  Berate me if you wish.  If dilemmas had perfect answers … they wouldn’t be dilemmas.  Thus, although I would vote for Ms. Haspel, I’m glad I don’t have to …

If I understand the reporting correctly, the decision actually looming for President Trump on May 12 is a procedural one:  whether to continue waivers of some of the U.S. sanctions on Iran effected as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the actual title of the agreement limiting Iranian nuclear activity) (the “JCPOA”).  Although there may be a question whether the U.S. will, from a technical standpoint, actually be withdrawing from the JCPOA if the President allows the waivers to lapse, Iran is clearly indicating that that it will deem any reinstitution of sanctions to be a violation of the arrangement, and that it will be free to renew the nuclear-related activity from which it has apparently abstained in accordance with the terms of the deal.

Whether the JCPOA is a “good deal” or a “bad deal” will be debated for decades to come.  I absolutely lack the acumen to venture a reasoned opinion, although it did seem to me a bit Pollyannaish to think that Iran, with a heritage dating back to the Persian Empire, a tradition of seeking influence beyond its borders, and a current established record of state-sponsored terrorism, would mellow sufficiently during the operative term of the arrangement such that it wouldn’t take the steps necessary to become a major nuclear threat as the restrictions wore off.  More importantly, two Americans who have my deepest respect in the realm of foreign affairs – Henry Kissinger and John McCain — expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of the deal before it was executed.

That said, all reports indicate that the international inspectors charged with monitoring Iran’s JCPOA compliance currently consider Iran to be in compliance.  Absent any evidence that Iran has violated the terms of the JCPOA, I would assert that it will be the gravest of errors if the President takes actions that result in the degradation or dissolution of the agreement.  Although commentators supporting the arrangement have come up with a raft of strategic and practical considerations why a de facto withdrawal from the deal is bad for the U.S., my basis is more fundamental:  Good deal or bad, we agreed to it.  It doesn’t matter, in this context, if we should have held out for permanent prohibitions on Iran’s nuclear-related activities, if Iran has types of non-nuclear weapons we consider significant threats, or if Iran is engaging in behaviors we don’t like, etc., etc., etc.  While we should move aggressively through other means to thwart Iran’s untoward activities outside the scope of the JCPOA, if Iran is sticking to the terms of the JCPOA, we should.  We gave our word.  It’s that simple.

All that can be said is … Vive la France …

As the primary players appear to be moving forward rapidly toward peace talks on the Korean Peninsula, it certainly appears that the President’s “crazy man” approach to the issue has been a primary motivator driving the North and South toward some sort of reconciliation.  It has been reported that the two Koreas may be open to a treaty to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

It seems a tenable assumption that in addition to the overriding desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust, the South has been driven to seek a greater level of reconciliation with the North due to a concern that the U.S. may not be as committed to defending it as it has been since the 1950’s, while the North has been prodded toward a more conciliatory stance by China – its main benefactor, without whom the regime would seemingly quickly perish – because China doesn’t want its current policies for extending its territorial, financial, and military reach thwarted or even impeded by any U.S. steps that might be taken in response to aggressive provocations by the North.

While any agreement that reduces tensions and the current North Korean nuclear threat is certainly to be lauded in the short run, the details of any pact will determine whether the arrangement is favorable for South Korean, Japanese, and American interests in the long run – i.e., over the next 25 years.

Some commentators assert that what both the Chinese and North Korean regimes have feared since the signing of the armistice is that the democratic and capitalist norms that have flourished in South Korea over the last 60 years would eventually sprout sympathetic movements in in the North, ultimately causing the toppling of the Kim regime and resulting in a united, free, democratic, capitalistic nation on China’s border.  It has occurred to me – a notion that as likely as not is all haywire – that President Xi might have a number of strategic reasons why he would be strongly encouraging the North to be forthcoming in the talks, and sending what signals of sympathy and conciliation he could to the South to facilitate a pact which provided assurance to all sides and enable all sides to save face.  I have wondered whether he might not be reasoning as follows:

First, an agreement would cool off the U.S., and cause the U.S. to shift its attention out of his back yard at a time when it still has the means to effectively serve as a counterweight to China’s influence in Asia if it so chooses.  He could conclude, based the recent transpiring of events, that every year that passes will probably make the U.S., both due to obviously increasingly constrained resources and an apparently diminishing resolve to be the world’s policeman, less willing and able to contest pressures China might ultimately wish to exert on South Korea.

Second, by using his influence with Chairman Kim to enable President Trump to claim some level of victory in his talks with Mr. Kim, Mr. Xi could — if he deftly positioned his desires as a tacit if not explicit quid pro quo – cause the U.S. to lighten up on any potential trade protection measures that will stifle the Chinese economy at a time when China is still significantly reliant on U.S. monetary policy, trade, and stability, and also cause the U.S. to continue to refrain from engaging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or like trade arrangements in the Asian theater, thereby enabling China to further fill the economic vacuum created by America’s withdrawal from TPP.

Third, it would provide him time to determine how to deal with Mr. Kim, who is clearly an irritant to China as well as to the West.  Commentators regularly assert that China and Mr. Xi support the Kim regime because they fear the instability that could result in the North from the fall of the regime.  Assuming that accurately reflects Mr. Xi’s current thinking, no one likes an erratic irritant; Mr. Xi might believe that given sufficient time, steps could be taken that would enable China to rid itself of an irritant without creating instability in the North.

Finally, contrary to China’s reported decades-long fears that South Korea’s liberal democracy and free market norms might sweep north, Mr. Xi might be determining that enabling the West to transfer its attention from the Korean Peninsula by defusing current tensions might, in the coming decades, afford China the opportunity to quietly and gradually obtain influence over the entire Korean Peninsula.  As I’ve indicated when making Noise before, I have been very struck by Richard Haass’ observation, in A World in Disarray, that in “economic, military, and diplomatic interactions,” “proximity counts [my emphasis].”  South Korea relies on exports for half of its growth, and China is its largest export partner (25%).  Although there is the argument that currently, China would hurt its own economy if it sought to bring significant pressure on South Korea, it seems more likely than not that over the coming years and decades, the relative weight of China’s influence on Seoul will grow – perhaps enabling it to persuade Seoul to abandon the THAAD defense missile system, to request the withdrawal of American troops, to give China a voice in its government, etc., etc.

Which, at long last, leads to the title of this post.  While the musings set forth here can be readily dismissed as far-fetched ramblings, one might consider how firmly Hong Kong’s liberal democratic norms stand today as compared to the day in 1997 when China assumed administration of Hong Kong.  Why wouldn’t one expect in the coming decades that China — unless effectively checked by the U.S. — will gradually exert economic and veiled military pressure on South Korea as it has with Hong Kong?

It behooves U.S. and South Korean policymakers to take great care with the details of any understanding negotiated in the coming months.

If I were a Senator, I’d vote to confirm Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State.  My main reason would be a procedural one:  as with Supreme Court Justices, I believe that any nominee of the President to a senior Administration post should be confirmed, subject to two criteria:  whether the candidate is objectively qualified for the position; and the absence of any other objective disqualifying factors (prior criminal conviction, demonstrable drug abuse problem, etc.).  The nominee’s subjective leanings – e.g., that s/he is too soft or too hardline in foreign policy – shouldn’t, in my view, be part of the assessment. 

Although many may not care for Mr. Pompeo’s stated positions on Iran and North Korea, his experience on the Congressional Intelligence Committee and at the CIA have made him arguably qualified to serve as Secretary of State.  I have not seen reference to anything that would constitute “other objective disqualifying factors” in the context I used the phrase above.  He has the confidence of the President – perhaps the most important subjective criteria to serve successfully as Secretary. 

Mr. Pompeo’s participation in the North Korea negotiations has, whether by accident or design on the President’s part, strengthened the case for his confirmation.  He has seemingly established some ability to communicate with Mr. Kim.  His expressed hardline stances perhaps give him more credibility than another diplomat considered more restrained.  Finally — although I have concerns that the outcome of the negotiations will not be in the long-term best interest of the United States (Noise to be saved for another day’s post) – since Mr. Pompeo is a central player for us in Korea negotiations now clearly underway, it would in my view be a mistake to undermine Mr. Pompeo by rejecting his nomination.

President Trump’s outrage for the children that have been gassed by the Syrian regime during the Syrian civil war should be lauded by all Americans.  That said, since the last several years’ actions and inactions of the current and prior U.S. administrations have served to significantly reduce the value of the cards we have to play in this venue, hopefully policymakers will consider whether a sole focus on military options may be too narrow and predictable.

Bashar Al-Assad is a hollow man, propped up by Russia and Iran for their own purposes.  Since Turkey has also engaged in the conflict more as an ally of Russia and Iran than of the U.S., it could also be helpful to U.S. interests if it suffers repercussions for its forays.  We might consider broadening our approach to give the Russians, the Iranians, and the Turks something more to think about, lessening their focus on their collaboration protecting Mr. Assad, including the following:

1. Russia’s strategic interests are on its European border, not in the Middle East. Issue a ringing commitment to NATO.  It will reassure our NATO allies, and make Mr. Putin aware that he has challenges in his own neighborhood.

 

2. Put more than talk behind our support of Ukraine. After quiet consultation with Congress – and with the U.K. and France if they would collaborate — the Administration should execute a codicil to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances pledging military assistance to Ukraine in the event its borders are infringed, and place a symbolic U.S. force at the Ukraine-Russia border.

 

3. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that Russian markets have been “rattled” by the Administration’s orders to U.S. investors to sell all holdings in companies related to a named Russian oligarch. Impose like targeted U.S. sanctions on other Russian oligarchs and institutions tied to President Putin, doing our best to avoid measures that will directly impact the Russian people.

 

4. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Russia – immediately and constantly. (We should be already doing this, but reportedly, we aren’t.)

 

5. As to Iran, the U.S. should impose whatever economic sanctions on Iranian officials it hasn’t already – again, to the extent that such sanctions will not directly impact the Iranian people.

 

6. Get support from EU nations to buttress our sanctions on Iran.  I note that the Journal reported in mid-March that EU countries – admittedly as a result of the President’s calls to exit the Iranian nuclear deal and for sanctions against Iranian ballistic missile and other activities – were hoping to forestall the U.S. exit by exploring measures to strengthen the EU’s sanctions against Iran. Although I entirely disagree with the President’s spoken intent to abandon the nuclear deal, he again needs to be given credit:  his “crazy man” approach appears to have borne fruit.  The U.S. should harvest the leverage the President has created by quietly indicating that it will continue in the nuclear deal – at least for a specified period — if the EU imposes an aggressive set of sanctions on Iran specified by U.S.

 

7. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Iran – immediately and constantly. (This, we probably are already doing.)

 

8. As to Turkey, double the number of U.S. troops assisting our Kurdish allies in the region of Syria in which the YPG is currently fighting ISIS on behalf of the alleged coalition. Inform the Turkish government that any military action against the YPG that results in American casualties will be dealt with severely.

 

9. Call for dividing Syria into separate states, as was done in Bosnia: an independent Kurdish state – perhaps linked to the Kurdistan region in Iraq; a independent Sunni state (75% of Syrians are Sunni); and an Alawite state under Assad control.

• It would give the Kurds something to continue to fight for, and would show the U.S. was firmly behind its staunchest and most effective ally against ISIS. Right now, the world doesn’t believe the U.S. can be trusted.
• It would be unsettling to the Iranians, since Iran has a significant Kurdish population; only a positive.
• Turkey would hate it. Turkey might require us to close our air bases in Turkey (that said, some analysts assert that the air bases are no longer strategic).  Such a step – if a careful assessment is made that U.S. defenses can be maintained without the air bases — may be worth the price:  President Erdogan has made himself a de facto dictator, abusing his people’s rights; Turkey has established too warm a relationship with Russia and Iran to be considered a reliable NATO ally; Turkey has condoned the beating of American protesters by Mr. Erdogan’s body guards when he visited the U.S.; Turkey has allegedly conspired with Michael Flynn for a kidnapping of Fethullah Gulan on American soil.  Turkey is, at best, a neutral in the U.S. struggle with Russia and Iran.  It should be treated that way.
• Concededly, Iraq would hate it for giving strength to its Kurdistan regional government. Admittedly a factor that weighs against the move; some accommodation to the Iraqis would need to be made.
• The Saudis and the other Gulf States would presumably welcome such a move, given the creation of another Sunni state to align against Iran.
• Ironically, President Assad might favor such a move if it meant that he was able to safely remain in power without the concern that the U.S. would any longer try to have him deposed. (Admittedly, he might well feel that given the way events have unfolded, there is no need to give up any of his country.)

 

10. It’s tempting to suggest calling for the establishment of a “Safe Zone” for the Syrian people, but a number of authorities indicate they’re hard to establish, hard to maintain, and sometimes become military targets. Unless there was true support from Russia – which, based upon the record, there is no reason to expect – such might tempt, rather than dissuade, Mr. Assad from further attacks on his own people.

Mr. Trump has shown himself willing to shuffle the deck; unfortunately, he’s also shown an affinity for strong men.  Watching the way Messrs. Putin and Erdogan have cozied up to Mr. Rouhani of Iran and to each other has hopefully taught the President that in the final analysis, friendship means nothing in foreign policy and that foreign leaders are like boys in the playground — will push their advantage until they face resistance.  The above suggestions certainly come with their own dangers; at the same time, limiting ourselves to military approaches in Syria also has significant risk in a venue where we have less strength and few effective options.

The first paragraph is from a note I wrote in April, 2016; the second paragraph my addendum as of today:

The Wall Street Journal has a fairly long article today on China’s efforts to claim the Scarborough Shoal — rocks, reefs, and such much closer to the Philippines than to China.  Such a claim would be a major hindrance to maritime shipping in the South China Sea.  The Journal reports — delicately — that we have approached the issue “with caution,” but are starting to step up our response.  My interpretation:  President Xi smiles a lot, but I think he’s the most dangerous man to our interests in the world [Mr. Putin would like to be, but he’s got too many other problems  ;)] … and I candidly think Mr. Xi’s decided to grab as much as he can while President Obama is in power, since the going will likely be rougher when dealing either with Ms. Clinton (has expertise and guts) or Mr. Trump (probably crazily unpredictable).

I haven’t seen anything to discredit my comments about Mr. Xi’s intentions almost two years ago, and Mr. Xi continued to push while Mr. Obama was in office (although Mr. Obama, to his credit, did somewhat overcome his second term gingerliness in foreign affairs and pushed back to a degree in the South China Sea).  However, I now add this qualifier: I think China’s efforts to push for strategic advantage have taken a slightly different tack – become more subtle during the last year – once Mr. Xi recognized that Mr. Trump is, by accident or design, reducing America’s leadership role and influence in world affairs (what Richard Haass has somewhat pejoratively termed our “abdication”).  Why should China act provocatively when current American foreign policy is creating a vacuum it’s ready to fill?

Richard Haass comments in A World in Disarray that when viewing the world through the prism of regionality, “Many of the most important economic, military, and diplomatic interactions take place at this level for the simple reason that proximity counts.”  I was reminded of his comment by an article in today’s Wall Street Journal that indicates that the South Korean government is allowing one of its largest companies, LG, to build a OLED production facility in China, which the Journal states will be “the first-ever [sic] transfer of the sophisticated display technology outside the country.”  The Chinese produce OLED technology, but currently lack South Korea’s sophistication.

Although the Journal further reports that the South Korean government has cautioned LG to increase its security to protect the technology, presumably all realize how futile those efforts will be for a factory placed in China.  In an admirably understated fashion, the article indicates that South Korea and China have warming diplomatic and economic relations, driven in part by a desire to have a coordinated policy regarding North Korea.

Referring back to a recent post, I would suggest that this South Korean decision is simply a manifestation of that government’s assessment of global realities.  It is at the epicenter of the quake that could result from the acrimonious exchanges of two mercurial leaders; it may well feel uneasy (understandably) about the United States’ willingness to defend it; it has very likely determined (rationally) that China can do more than the United States to protect it against North Korean aggression; and it has apparently decided (certainly uneasily) that in the current bellicose atmosphere, there is less risk from China ultimately attempting to exploit their closer ties to sap its economic and political freedoms than there is that North Korea will take cataclysmic action affecting the lives of its citizens.

While – since proximity counts, and China is the dominant Asian power – South Korea may in coming years have begun to establish closer ties with China in any event, it’s hard not to conclude that these sorts of diplomatic shifts will occur at an accelerating rate due to the visceral perception that the U.S., despite its occasional protestations to the contrary, is in the process of disengaging from many of its traditional alliances.

I have heard some of our people who are troubled by President Trump’s actions in his first year in office console themselves by saying, “This too shall pass.”  In the domestic sphere, they may be right.  In the foreign sphere, I’d suggest that the President’s behavior in this single year has in the most important respect left an impression on foreign leaders that won’t be undone for generations, if at all:  a faith in the constancy of America.  Although specific Trump foreign policy approaches may (almost certainly will) be reversed – his laissez affaire approach toward Russian aggression, his economic disengagement in Asia, his withdrawal from the Climate Accord – it seems highly doubtful that any foreign leader with any sense will in the foreseeable future base his/her nation’s well-being on any long-term commitment from the United States (I know I wouldn’t).  Mr. Trump’s election and behavior have made clear that no matter how sincere a given President might be in providing assurances on a given policy, the American people are capable of electing a successor who completely undoes previously agreed-upon commitments.  This loss of confidence may have the silver lining of getting those nations generally aligned with us to become more self-reliant; with shrinking funds, our ability to cast a defense net over our allies would be unraveling over the next decade in any event.  That said, this loss of confidence could in the coming years and decades cause our Asian allies, out of a sense of self-preservation, to seek closer ties to China than we will like, and perhaps similarly cause our European allies to be less willing to assist us in confronting inappropriate Russian behavior (due to their need for its oil) than we would hope.     

This is an update of something I wrote before beginning this site:

As President Trump begins his trip to Asia, I don’t discount the possibility that the President has made headway with regard to North Korea.  (I note that Thae Yong-Ho, a North Korean diplomat defector, indicated on the PBS Newshour this past week that he did believe that the President’s rhetoric had had some deterrent effect on Kim Jong Un).   North Korea will obviously be the primary topic when Presidents Trump and Xi meet; although Mr. Xi’s current position is very strong while Mr. Trump’s position is clearly politically challenged, if Mr. Trump has and continues to privately indicate to President Xi that “If you don’t do something about this, I will,” I’d take that comment seriously if I were Mr. Xi given Mr. Trump’s unpredictability.  However — particularly given Mr. Thae’s view that any attack by the U.S. on North Korea would result in a full-scale war on the peninsula — it seems that the only true solution to the North Korean problem is regime change from the inside.  We don’t have people on the inside that, with appropriate support, can bring about regime change, but I’d guess that the Chinese do; a Chinese puppet atop North Korea would undoubtedly be preferable to us as well as to the Chinese.  However, an effort like this, if it is indeed being undertaken, will undoubtedly take months, and it seems likely that Mr. Xi was unwilling to do anything that might upset the status quo until his power was reaffirmed and enhanced at the recent Chinese Communist National Congress.  Mr. Kim clearly has superlative antennae for survival, and certainly has to be attuned to the possibility of a Chinese move against him; it would seem that the Chinese will not want to move so quickly as to look like they’ve consorted with the Americans against an ally.