The first paragraph is from a note I wrote in April, 2016; the second paragraph my addendum as of today:

The Wall Street Journal has a fairly long article today on China’s efforts to claim the Scarborough Shoal — rocks, reefs, and such much closer to the Philippines than to China.  Such a claim would be a major hindrance to maritime shipping in the South China Sea.  The Journal reports — delicately — that we have approached the issue “with caution,” but are starting to step up our response.  My interpretation:  President Xi smiles a lot, but I think he’s the most dangerous man to our interests in the world [Mr. Putin would like to be, but he’s got too many other problems  ;)] … and I candidly think Mr. Xi’s decided to grab as much as he can while President Obama is in power, since the going will likely be rougher when dealing either with Ms. Clinton (has expertise and guts) or Mr. Trump (probably crazily unpredictable).

I haven’t seen anything to discredit my comments about Mr. Xi’s intentions almost two years ago, and Mr. Xi continued to push while Mr. Obama was in office (although Mr. Obama, to his credit, did somewhat overcome his second term gingerliness in foreign affairs and pushed back to a degree in the South China Sea).  However, I now add this qualifier: I think China’s efforts to push for strategic advantage have taken a slightly different tack – become more subtle during the last year – once Mr. Xi recognized that Mr. Trump is, by accident or design, reducing America’s leadership role and influence in world affairs (what Richard Haass has somewhat pejoratively termed our “abdication”).  Why should China act provocatively when current American foreign policy is creating a vacuum it’s ready to fill?

Richard Haass comments in A World in Disarray that when viewing the world through the prism of regionality, “Many of the most important economic, military, and diplomatic interactions take place at this level for the simple reason that proximity counts.”  I was reminded of his comment by an article in today’s Wall Street Journal that indicates that the South Korean government is allowing one of its largest companies, LG, to build a OLED production facility in China, which the Journal states will be “the first-ever [sic] transfer of the sophisticated display technology outside the country.”  The Chinese produce OLED technology, but currently lack South Korea’s sophistication.

Although the Journal further reports that the South Korean government has cautioned LG to increase its security to protect the technology, presumably all realize how futile those efforts will be for a factory placed in China.  In an admirably understated fashion, the article indicates that South Korea and China have warming diplomatic and economic relations, driven in part by a desire to have a coordinated policy regarding North Korea.

Referring back to a recent post, I would suggest that this South Korean decision is simply a manifestation of that government’s assessment of global realities.  It is at the epicenter of the quake that could result from the acrimonious exchanges of two mercurial leaders; it may well feel uneasy (understandably) about the United States’ willingness to defend it; it has very likely determined (rationally) that China can do more than the United States to protect it against North Korean aggression; and it has apparently decided (certainly uneasily) that in the current bellicose atmosphere, there is less risk from China ultimately attempting to exploit their closer ties to sap its economic and political freedoms than there is that North Korea will take cataclysmic action affecting the lives of its citizens.

While – since proximity counts, and China is the dominant Asian power – South Korea may in coming years have begun to establish closer ties with China in any event, it’s hard not to conclude that these sorts of diplomatic shifts will occur at an accelerating rate due to the visceral perception that the U.S., despite its occasional protestations to the contrary, is in the process of disengaging from many of its traditional alliances.

I have heard some of our people who are troubled by President Trump’s actions in his first year in office console themselves by saying, “This too shall pass.”  In the domestic sphere, they may be right.  In the foreign sphere, I’d suggest that the President’s behavior in this single year has in the most important respect left an impression on foreign leaders that won’t be undone for generations, if at all:  a faith in the constancy of America.  Although specific Trump foreign policy approaches may (almost certainly will) be reversed – his laissez affaire approach toward Russian aggression, his economic disengagement in Asia, his withdrawal from the Climate Accord – it seems highly doubtful that any foreign leader with any sense will in the foreseeable future base his/her nation’s well-being on any long-term commitment from the United States (I know I wouldn’t).  Mr. Trump’s election and behavior have made clear that no matter how sincere a given President might be in providing assurances on a given policy, the American people are capable of electing a successor who completely undoes previously agreed-upon commitments.  This loss of confidence may have the silver lining of getting those nations generally aligned with us to become more self-reliant; with shrinking funds, our ability to cast a defense net over our allies would be unraveling over the next decade in any event.  That said, this loss of confidence could in the coming years and decades cause our Asian allies, out of a sense of self-preservation, to seek closer ties to China than we will like, and perhaps similarly cause our European allies to be less willing to assist us in confronting inappropriate Russian behavior (due to their need for its oil) than we would hope.     

This is an update of something I wrote before beginning this site:

As President Trump begins his trip to Asia, I don’t discount the possibility that the President has made headway with regard to North Korea.  (I note that Thae Yong-Ho, a North Korean diplomat defector, indicated on the PBS Newshour this past week that he did believe that the President’s rhetoric had had some deterrent effect on Kim Jong Un).   North Korea will obviously be the primary topic when Presidents Trump and Xi meet; although Mr. Xi’s current position is very strong while Mr. Trump’s position is clearly politically challenged, if Mr. Trump has and continues to privately indicate to President Xi that “If you don’t do something about this, I will,” I’d take that comment seriously if I were Mr. Xi given Mr. Trump’s unpredictability.  However — particularly given Mr. Thae’s view that any attack by the U.S. on North Korea would result in a full-scale war on the peninsula — it seems that the only true solution to the North Korean problem is regime change from the inside.  We don’t have people on the inside that, with appropriate support, can bring about regime change, but I’d guess that the Chinese do; a Chinese puppet atop North Korea would undoubtedly be preferable to us as well as to the Chinese.  However, an effort like this, if it is indeed being undertaken, will undoubtedly take months, and it seems likely that Mr. Xi was unwilling to do anything that might upset the status quo until his power was reaffirmed and enhanced at the recent Chinese Communist National Congress.  Mr. Kim clearly has superlative antennae for survival, and certainly has to be attuned to the possibility of a Chinese move against him; it would seem that the Chinese will not want to move so quickly as to look like they’ve consorted with the Americans against an ally.

It seems that the tragic incident in Niger is evolving into storylines relating to why few or no members of Congress were aware of our deployment in Niger, and whether there were intelligence and operational deficiencies that, in turn, left our men exposed before the ambush and insufficiently supported after it occurred.  Although I may be the last American alive to absorb this, the Niger incident has brought home to me the ramifications of the apparent decision of the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations that we have (and are probably going to indefinitely have) our troops at risk in countries across the globe to conduct a worldwide struggle against terrorism.

President Bush declared in September, 2001:

“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

My focus after 9/11 was on al Qaeda; perhaps only I didn’t grasp the full implications of his declaration:  that he was committing us to a struggle that would indeed cover the globe, last for decades and – whether or not the President realized it at the time — could never be entirely won.  Over the years, the scope of the mission has perhaps been blurred at times by finite territorial references – “the war in Afghanistan,” “the war in Iraq,” “the war in Syria,” “retaking ISIS’ declared Caliphate,” etc., etc.  What makes me think that I’m probably the one that is slow on the uptake is the lack of reaction to Sen. Graham’s straightforward comment this weekend relating to the Niger incident:

“This is an endless war without boundaries – no limitations on time and geography.”

If the effort is indeed to be “endless” and worldwide — and having small deployments of our people in places like Niger seems to indicate that it is – on the off chance that I am not the only one of our people that failed to grasp the full import of President Bush’s words and intentions, I would suggest that President Trump address the nation, and clearly articulate that this is a mission of indefinite containment – essentially a police action — against shifting adversaries, and spell out what our people can reasonably expect regarding the lives, resources, and years that will be spent on the effort (to follow the lives, resources, and years that we have already devoted to it).  This is not to say whether this is, or is not, an appropriate mission; however, we should be sure that our citizens understand the breadth and duration of the commitment, and the need for it; recognize that this struggle will draw resources that we might prefer to invest elsewhere while lacking the likelihood of finality; and accept it.