It generally serves little purpose to regurgitate information available via a brief internet search, but since many people are living their lives without delving into the gory details of every policy disagreement in Washington, it’s worth calling out the current dispute between the White House and just about everybody else in Washington (Democrats, Republicans, and our U.S. security apparatus) over whether to continue sanctions imposed on Chinese telecommunications manufacturer ZTE by – ironically — the Trump Administration.

ZTE has been involved in our telecom industry for years.  It both supplies equipment to some of our small (mostly rural) telecom companies and buys parts (including fiber) from American companies to make its equipment.  These companies are obviously adversely impacted by governmental limitation on their ability to transact with ZTE.  Additionally, ZTE issues have a potential impact on (1) our agriculture industry and (2) Chinese approval of an acquisition by U.S. company Qualcomm deemed critical to Qualcomm’s growth.

ZTE is also reportedly one of China’s key players in the battle for future strategic telecommunications dominance being waged between the U.S. and China.  I understand that 5G is the new horizon; ZTE is one of the companies striving for a foothold in the technology.

Our government has considered ZTE to be a security threat for some time, and banned purchase of its equipment by NASA, the Justice and Commerce Departments in 2013.  In February, our security agencies warned consumers about buying Chinese-manufactured phones.  In early May, the Pentagon banned the purchase of ZTE and Huawei (another Chinese telecom manufacturer) phones near military bases.  The overall concern is that China could utilize the equipment to conduct electronic spying on Americans.  ZTE denies that the equipment could be so utilized, and both China and ZTE deny that the government places any pressure on ZTE.  (Given what even we lay people know about telecommunications technology, it’s hard to believe that ZTE equipment couldn’t be so utilized, or that China, even if it places no pressure on ZTE today, couldn’t start doing so tomorrow.)

If the e-surveillance issue wasn’t enough, ZTE is a bad actor; the Trump Commerce Department placed its ban on American companies’ sales of parts to ZTE because it determined (and is apparently undisputed) that ZTE skirted sanctions in selling equipment to North Korea and Iran.

Our ban has apparently crippled ZTE, a matter of sufficient import to China that President Xi personally raised the ban with President Trump, prompting this tweet by the President:

“President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done! [My emphasis]”

Despite almost unanimous bipartisan concern, the Administration is now seeking to lift its sanctions on ZTE – allowing it to remain in business – provided that it pay a fine in excess of $1 billion, submit to U.S. inspectors, and make changes to its management team.   China would agree to remove billions of dollars of tariffs on our agricultural products as part of the deal.

Aside from the obvious – that neither the President’s supporters nor detractors in this country care about protecting Chinese jobs – I would submit that the President’s actions in trying to resuscitate ZTE are troubling from two perspectives:

• Defective strategic thinking. Acknowledging that the impact to certain of our companies could be severe if we hold fast on the ZTE sanctions, the President (as noted most articulately by Sen. Marco Rubio) is mixing trade with national security.  The two don’t mix.  I fear that the President is exhibiting the attitude sometimes evident among people with business backgrounds:  believing dollars justify means.  Even putting aside potential security issues and what should be our goal of limiting China’s strategic technological advancement, letting ZTE off the sanctions sends the message that no matter how bad an actor performs, we can be bought off.  I would rather see us temporarily assist the telecoms and farmers adversely impacted by the sanctions than let ZTE off the hook.  (Qualcomm might just be out of luck.)

 

• The appearance of self-enrichment. I assume that even the President’s most fervent supporters will concede that his sudden reversal on his own administration’s sanctions on ZTE – with a tweet expressing concern for Chinese jobs – was bizarre.  Coming at about the same time as the Chinese government approved a number of trademarks for Ivanka Trump and the Chinese government  granted a $500 million loan to a Chinese construction company for work on an Indonesian theme park (the loan is reportedly the majority of the entire park project’s funding) featuring Trump properties (called park “flagships” by National Review), there is the obvious suspicion that the President’s reversal on ZTE is a quid pro quo for China’s assistance to his family business.

Right now, there are a number of bipartisan moves in Congress to bar the Administration from lifting its bans on ZTE.  Although I generally believe that a President needs to have a fairly free hand in conducting foreign policy – nothing can be achieved when s/he has to deal with 535 Congressional kibitzers – since his discussion with President Xi, he has been – at the very least — sufficiently tone deaf to the ramifications and appearances of his approach that that Congressional interjection is not only warranted – it’s vital.

I got up this morning thinking about yesterday’s post regarding the Administration’s move of our Embassy to Jerusalem.  Keeping in mind the first Principle of this site – that anything I enter may well be all haywire – I see nothing conceptually amiss with what I posted … but woke up realizing that it was too antiseptic, too clinical an analysis of the foreign policy factors in play.  The piece failed to address the physical suffering and emotional anguish being visited every day on people in the Mideast – the overwhelming majority of whom simply want to live their lives and raise their families in peace and without want.  It’s hard not to believe that many of those that actively engage in conflicts are guided by many of the same reactions Americans would have if placed in similar circumstances.

While it is likely, regardless of the opening of our Embassy in Jerusalem, that there would have been disturbances along the Gaza Strip on what the Palestinians call “Nakba Day” (the “Day of Catastrophe”), and that these disturbances would have resulted in some number of deaths and injuries, it seems almost certain that the Embassy move exacerbated the Palestinian anger and frustration already existing.  Although – as noted in the earlier post — I don’t see what strategic foreign policy objectives we advanced by moving the Embassy, I most sincerely hope that I’ve grossly misunderstood the situation.  While some reports indicate that a good number of the Palestinian casualties were members of Hamas, others were not.  I want to hope that we are not responsible for additional innocent lives lost or forever marred because of a move made primarily for U.S. domestic political purposes.

I was asked today for reactions to the Trump Administration’s opening of our Embassy in Jerusalem.  Here we go …

One can find statements by Presidents Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama, obviously predating the Trump Administration, all expressing a preference for moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.  Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act in 1995, calling for the embassy to be moved to Jerusalem by 1999 (this hasn’t been done due to a series of authorized Presidential waivers based on security concerns).  The Senate passed a resolution 90 – 0 last June, affirming the Act and calling upon the President to abide by its provisions.  The Obama Administration’s ambassador to Israel said tonight on PBS that moving the embassy was “appropriate.”  President Trump had pledged during his campaign to make the move.  Sen. Chuck Schumer supports the move.  The President can rightly point out that moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem has traditionally had bipartisan support.

Even so, I think it was a strategic mistake.  Despite the Administration’s claim that moving the embassy will help the peace process, given the general reaction to the move throughout the international community, I’m having trouble seeing how it fulfills any strategic foreign policy objectives:

• It’s added more gas to the raging fire that is the Middle East. To boot, having the opening on the anniversary of Israel’s establishment unnecessarily added insult to injury for many in the Muslim world.
• It’s a chip we didn’t need to play. Israel is already absolutely ecstatic about the support it is receiving from the Trump Administration; it’s difficult to see how we can get any warmer support from Israel for our objectives than the Administration has already garnered.
• A criticism that resonates with me is that we took the action without getting anything for it – such as Israeli acquiescence in a two-state solution with the Palestinians, or Israeli collaboration in providing humanitarian aid for the Palestinians under terrible duress in Gaza.
• The Wall Street Journal has reported that the move has drawn “repeated condemnation” from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt – three allies that form a primary part of our ballast in maintaining Middle East stability against Iran. (The Obama Administration’s Israel Ambassador also indicated tonight that although these three nations will continue to cooperate with us and Israel because they have greater concern about Iranian aggression than they have care for the Palestinians, the optics of the last few days will make it difficult for these nations to cooperate openly with Israel.)
• The U.K. and France also oppose the move – adding more tension to a relationship already coarsened by our withdrawal from the Iranian Nuclear Deal.
• If that wasn’t sufficient, my own pet peeve is that the move has given President Erdogan of Turkey – a de facto dictator who has sufficiently cozied up to Russia and Iran lately that I consider Turkey an uncertain NATO ally at best — a chance to condemn Israel and side with U.K. and France against us.

Suffice it to say, it’s not an action I would have taken.  One would have to be pretty dewy-eyed not to believe that domestic political motivations played a large part in the decision, helping the President to both reinforce the allegiance of parts of his base committed to the move while perhaps softening the opposition of some of those confronting him; but those musings are best kept for Noise about his political prospects that we’ll undoubtedly be making in the coming months …

As I’ve previously indicated in these pages, when considering whether a Presidential nominee should be confirmed by the Senate, I follow a pretty simple two-factor analysis (which, admittedly, is ne’er followed in the current hyper-partisan environment):  Is the nominee objectively qualified for the position?  If so, is there any other objective factor that should nonetheless disqualify him/her from the position for which s/he has been nominated (e.g., prior criminal conviction, demonstrated drug abuse problem, etc.)?  Since the Constitution provides our President the power to nominate whom s/he considers appropriate, I don’t believe that a nominee’s subjective leanings (e.g., whether s/he supports or opposes abortion rights, whether s/he is too soft or too hardline in foreign policy) should be part of the equation.  Accordingly, I believe that Judge Garland should not only have received a hearing, but – absent unreported information coming to light – should also have been confirmed by the Senate, and that it was appropriate that Judge Gorsuch and Secretary of State Pompeo received confirmation.

That said, one of the many reasons that I’m glad that I’m not a sitting Senator is that if I was, I would have to consider whether to vote to confirm Gina Haspel as CIA Director.

Ms. Haspel easily passes the first hurdle; she’s been called the most qualified nominee to head the CIA in the Agency’s history, and has received what USA Today has referred to as “glowing accolades” from former Agency directors that have served in both parties’ administrations.  However, Ms. Haspel’s nomination is the rare one that seems – at least for me – to require careful reflection as to whether the appointment should be rejected due to an “other objective factor” as I used the phrase above.  It’s undisputed that Ms. Haspel ran a CIA “black site” that conducted waterboarding in the wake of 9/11; that she thereafter participated in the destruction of videotapes of questionable interrogations (although she was cleared of inappropriate behavior by a subsequent internal CIA inquiry); and that although she has testified that she supports the Congressional ban on and pledged not to conduct the kinds of activities that she and the CIA conducted after 9/11, she didn’t explicitly characterize those activities as immoral.  Given her record, does Ms. Haspel possess the appropriate moral compass to serve in the position that – along with the presidency itself – is arguably the most consistently subject to the harshest morally conflicting pressures?

It has been widely reported that Sen. John McCain, notwithstanding his warm words for Ms. Haspel’s service to our country over the past three decades, considers Ms. Haspel’s unwillingness to call the CIA’s activities immoral “disqualifying” for the CIA directorship.

I have the deepest respect for Mr. McCain in the realm of foreign affairs.  His sentiments, given his own experience as a POW, are understandable.  At the same time, former CIA Director Michael Hayden, in his book, The Assault on Intelligence, called Ms. Haspel’s earlier selection for the Agency’s Deputy Director under Mr. Pompeo an “inspired choice” due to the high regard Ms. Haspel enjoys among CIA personnel.  Mr. Hayden – who makes clear in his book that he is no admirer of President Trump – argues that those (which would include him) that played a part in the government’s “electronic surveillance, metadata collection, renditions, detentions, interrogations, and targeted killings” have a greater sensitivity to lines that should not be crossed than those that didn’t have to face the moral questions implicit in the conduct of such activities.  It’s a point – although one readily subject to skepticism.

I am less concerned about Ms. Haspel’s unwillingness to condemn the CIA’s past activities, given her pledge not to carry on such activities during her directorship.  I consider it a manner of establishing leadership.  I agree with a premise advanced by others that one does not build esprit de corps in an organization that one intends to lead by trashing the group – particularly if one’s comments, given one’s record, are certain to be viewed by the organization as hypocritical means to advance one’s own career.  Interestingly, Mr. Hayden also states that he viewed Ms. Haspel’s appointment as Deputy Director to be “pitch perfect” because it meant neither a repeat nor repudiation of the Agency’s past.

At the same time, I am concerned with her acknowledged participation in the destruction of the interrogation videotapes.  Can she be trusted?  The only responses I’ve seen to these concerns are that she was following orders (so were Nazi enablers) and was found blameless for the inappropriate operation in the subsequent CIA inquiry (perhaps a whitewash for a loyal and diligent employee).  I’m not sure that these would be sufficient responses for me under many circumstances, although I balance this unease against the ringing affirmations of both Leon Panetta and Mr. Hayden that Ms. Haspel will be willing to “speak truth to power” if required to do so in her interactions with the President.

After all of this “on the one hand, on the other hand” (sounding more than a bit like Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof):  I reluctantly support Ms. Haspel’s nomination.  My reasons are many, albeit all simple:  the confidence of former Directors that she will speak truth to a President who, in my opinion, has insufficient respect for the rule of law; her undisputed qualifications and knowledge of the Agency; her willingness, based upon past experience, to disavow any return to the activities that she engaged in post-9/11; her steadfastness in being unwilling to cast aspersions upon the CIA’s post-9/11 activities to further her own career; the high regard that the professionals in a vital, but now beleaguered, part of our national defense have for her; the fact that almost anyone that the President nominates in her stead will probably be less qualified, have less respect for and from the Agency, and be more prone to Presidential pressure; and the fact that we, frankly, need someone tough to lead the CIA.  We confront bad state and non-state actors across the globe.  Although most of us live in an ivory tower, the fact remains [now, sounding like Jack Nicholson’s Col. Nathan Jessup in A Few Good Men  😉 ]:  we need someone who is willing to fight to protect our ivory tower in places and ways that we don’t go to or know about.  Although there is no one alive I respect more than Pope Francis, he wouldn’t be a good fit for the CIA Directorship.  Ms. Haspel is.

I concede that there is more than an element of faith in the expectation that someone that admittedly participated in activities many call torture and in the destruction of videotapes of inappropriate interrogations will be the speaker of truth, guardian of appropriate interrogation practices, and the protector of the rule of law.  Berate me if you wish.  If dilemmas had perfect answers … they wouldn’t be dilemmas.  Thus, although I would vote for Ms. Haspel, I’m glad I don’t have to …

If I understand the reporting correctly, the decision actually looming for President Trump on May 12 is a procedural one:  whether to continue waivers of some of the U.S. sanctions on Iran effected as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the actual title of the agreement limiting Iranian nuclear activity) (the “JCPOA”).  Although there may be a question whether the U.S. will, from a technical standpoint, actually be withdrawing from the JCPOA if the President allows the waivers to lapse, Iran is clearly indicating that that it will deem any reinstitution of sanctions to be a violation of the arrangement, and that it will be free to renew the nuclear-related activity from which it has apparently abstained in accordance with the terms of the deal.

Whether the JCPOA is a “good deal” or a “bad deal” will be debated for decades to come.  I absolutely lack the acumen to venture a reasoned opinion, although it did seem to me a bit Pollyannaish to think that Iran, with a heritage dating back to the Persian Empire, a tradition of seeking influence beyond its borders, and a current established record of state-sponsored terrorism, would mellow sufficiently during the operative term of the arrangement such that it wouldn’t take the steps necessary to become a major nuclear threat as the restrictions wore off.  More importantly, two Americans who have my deepest respect in the realm of foreign affairs – Henry Kissinger and John McCain — expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of the deal before it was executed.

That said, all reports indicate that the international inspectors charged with monitoring Iran’s JCPOA compliance currently consider Iran to be in compliance.  Absent any evidence that Iran has violated the terms of the JCPOA, I would assert that it will be the gravest of errors if the President takes actions that result in the degradation or dissolution of the agreement.  Although commentators supporting the arrangement have come up with a raft of strategic and practical considerations why a de facto withdrawal from the deal is bad for the U.S., my basis is more fundamental:  Good deal or bad, we agreed to it.  It doesn’t matter, in this context, if we should have held out for permanent prohibitions on Iran’s nuclear-related activities, if Iran has types of non-nuclear weapons we consider significant threats, or if Iran is engaging in behaviors we don’t like, etc., etc., etc.  While we should move aggressively through other means to thwart Iran’s untoward activities outside the scope of the JCPOA, if Iran is sticking to the terms of the JCPOA, we should.  We gave our word.  It’s that simple.

All that can be said is … Vive la France …

As the primary players appear to be moving forward rapidly toward peace talks on the Korean Peninsula, it certainly appears that the President’s “crazy man” approach to the issue has been a primary motivator driving the North and South toward some sort of reconciliation.  It has been reported that the two Koreas may be open to a treaty to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

It seems a tenable assumption that in addition to the overriding desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust, the South has been driven to seek a greater level of reconciliation with the North due to a concern that the U.S. may not be as committed to defending it as it has been since the 1950’s, while the North has been prodded toward a more conciliatory stance by China – its main benefactor, without whom the regime would seemingly quickly perish – because China doesn’t want its current policies for extending its territorial, financial, and military reach thwarted or even impeded by any U.S. steps that might be taken in response to aggressive provocations by the North.

While any agreement that reduces tensions and the current North Korean nuclear threat is certainly to be lauded in the short run, the details of any pact will determine whether the arrangement is favorable for South Korean, Japanese, and American interests in the long run – i.e., over the next 25 years.

Some commentators assert that what both the Chinese and North Korean regimes have feared since the signing of the armistice is that the democratic and capitalist norms that have flourished in South Korea over the last 60 years would eventually sprout sympathetic movements in in the North, ultimately causing the toppling of the Kim regime and resulting in a united, free, democratic, capitalistic nation on China’s border.  It has occurred to me – a notion that as likely as not is all haywire – that President Xi might have a number of strategic reasons why he would be strongly encouraging the North to be forthcoming in the talks, and sending what signals of sympathy and conciliation he could to the South to facilitate a pact which provided assurance to all sides and enable all sides to save face.  I have wondered whether he might not be reasoning as follows:

First, an agreement would cool off the U.S., and cause the U.S. to shift its attention out of his back yard at a time when it still has the means to effectively serve as a counterweight to China’s influence in Asia if it so chooses.  He could conclude, based the recent transpiring of events, that every year that passes will probably make the U.S., both due to obviously increasingly constrained resources and an apparently diminishing resolve to be the world’s policeman, less willing and able to contest pressures China might ultimately wish to exert on South Korea.

Second, by using his influence with Chairman Kim to enable President Trump to claim some level of victory in his talks with Mr. Kim, Mr. Xi could — if he deftly positioned his desires as a tacit if not explicit quid pro quo – cause the U.S. to lighten up on any potential trade protection measures that will stifle the Chinese economy at a time when China is still significantly reliant on U.S. monetary policy, trade, and stability, and also cause the U.S. to continue to refrain from engaging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or like trade arrangements in the Asian theater, thereby enabling China to further fill the economic vacuum created by America’s withdrawal from TPP.

Third, it would provide him time to determine how to deal with Mr. Kim, who is clearly an irritant to China as well as to the West.  Commentators regularly assert that China and Mr. Xi support the Kim regime because they fear the instability that could result in the North from the fall of the regime.  Assuming that accurately reflects Mr. Xi’s current thinking, no one likes an erratic irritant; Mr. Xi might believe that given sufficient time, steps could be taken that would enable China to rid itself of an irritant without creating instability in the North.

Finally, contrary to China’s reported decades-long fears that South Korea’s liberal democracy and free market norms might sweep north, Mr. Xi might be determining that enabling the West to transfer its attention from the Korean Peninsula by defusing current tensions might, in the coming decades, afford China the opportunity to quietly and gradually obtain influence over the entire Korean Peninsula.  As I’ve indicated when making Noise before, I have been very struck by Richard Haass’ observation, in A World in Disarray, that in “economic, military, and diplomatic interactions,” “proximity counts [my emphasis].”  South Korea relies on exports for half of its growth, and China is its largest export partner (25%).  Although there is the argument that currently, China would hurt its own economy if it sought to bring significant pressure on South Korea, it seems more likely than not that over the coming years and decades, the relative weight of China’s influence on Seoul will grow – perhaps enabling it to persuade Seoul to abandon the THAAD defense missile system, to request the withdrawal of American troops, to give China a voice in its government, etc., etc.

Which, at long last, leads to the title of this post.  While the musings set forth here can be readily dismissed as far-fetched ramblings, one might consider how firmly Hong Kong’s liberal democratic norms stand today as compared to the day in 1997 when China assumed administration of Hong Kong.  Why wouldn’t one expect in the coming decades that China — unless effectively checked by the U.S. — will gradually exert economic and veiled military pressure on South Korea as it has with Hong Kong?

It behooves U.S. and South Korean policymakers to take great care with the details of any understanding negotiated in the coming months.

If I were a Senator, I’d vote to confirm Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State.  My main reason would be a procedural one:  as with Supreme Court Justices, I believe that any nominee of the President to a senior Administration post should be confirmed, subject to two criteria:  whether the candidate is objectively qualified for the position; and the absence of any other objective disqualifying factors (prior criminal conviction, demonstrable drug abuse problem, etc.).  The nominee’s subjective leanings – e.g., that s/he is too soft or too hardline in foreign policy – shouldn’t, in my view, be part of the assessment. 

Although many may not care for Mr. Pompeo’s stated positions on Iran and North Korea, his experience on the Congressional Intelligence Committee and at the CIA have made him arguably qualified to serve as Secretary of State.  I have not seen reference to anything that would constitute “other objective disqualifying factors” in the context I used the phrase above.  He has the confidence of the President – perhaps the most important subjective criteria to serve successfully as Secretary. 

Mr. Pompeo’s participation in the North Korea negotiations has, whether by accident or design on the President’s part, strengthened the case for his confirmation.  He has seemingly established some ability to communicate with Mr. Kim.  His expressed hardline stances perhaps give him more credibility than another diplomat considered more restrained.  Finally — although I have concerns that the outcome of the negotiations will not be in the long-term best interest of the United States (Noise to be saved for another day’s post) – since Mr. Pompeo is a central player for us in Korea negotiations now clearly underway, it would in my view be a mistake to undermine Mr. Pompeo by rejecting his nomination.

President Trump’s outrage for the children that have been gassed by the Syrian regime during the Syrian civil war should be lauded by all Americans.  That said, since the last several years’ actions and inactions of the current and prior U.S. administrations have served to significantly reduce the value of the cards we have to play in this venue, hopefully policymakers will consider whether a sole focus on military options may be too narrow and predictable.

Bashar Al-Assad is a hollow man, propped up by Russia and Iran for their own purposes.  Since Turkey has also engaged in the conflict more as an ally of Russia and Iran than of the U.S., it could also be helpful to U.S. interests if it suffers repercussions for its forays.  We might consider broadening our approach to give the Russians, the Iranians, and the Turks something more to think about, lessening their focus on their collaboration protecting Mr. Assad, including the following:

1. Russia’s strategic interests are on its European border, not in the Middle East. Issue a ringing commitment to NATO.  It will reassure our NATO allies, and make Mr. Putin aware that he has challenges in his own neighborhood.

 

2. Put more than talk behind our support of Ukraine. After quiet consultation with Congress – and with the U.K. and France if they would collaborate — the Administration should execute a codicil to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances pledging military assistance to Ukraine in the event its borders are infringed, and place a symbolic U.S. force at the Ukraine-Russia border.

 

3. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that Russian markets have been “rattled” by the Administration’s orders to U.S. investors to sell all holdings in companies related to a named Russian oligarch. Impose like targeted U.S. sanctions on other Russian oligarchs and institutions tied to President Putin, doing our best to avoid measures that will directly impact the Russian people.

 

4. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Russia – immediately and constantly. (We should be already doing this, but reportedly, we aren’t.)

 

5. As to Iran, the U.S. should impose whatever economic sanctions on Iranian officials it hasn’t already – again, to the extent that such sanctions will not directly impact the Iranian people.

 

6. Get support from EU nations to buttress our sanctions on Iran.  I note that the Journal reported in mid-March that EU countries – admittedly as a result of the President’s calls to exit the Iranian nuclear deal and for sanctions against Iranian ballistic missile and other activities – were hoping to forestall the U.S. exit by exploring measures to strengthen the EU’s sanctions against Iran. Although I entirely disagree with the President’s spoken intent to abandon the nuclear deal, he again needs to be given credit:  his “crazy man” approach appears to have borne fruit.  The U.S. should harvest the leverage the President has created by quietly indicating that it will continue in the nuclear deal – at least for a specified period — if the EU imposes an aggressive set of sanctions on Iran specified by U.S.

 

7. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Iran – immediately and constantly. (This, we probably are already doing.)

 

8. As to Turkey, double the number of U.S. troops assisting our Kurdish allies in the region of Syria in which the YPG is currently fighting ISIS on behalf of the alleged coalition. Inform the Turkish government that any military action against the YPG that results in American casualties will be dealt with severely.

 

9. Call for dividing Syria into separate states, as was done in Bosnia: an independent Kurdish state – perhaps linked to the Kurdistan region in Iraq; a independent Sunni state (75% of Syrians are Sunni); and an Alawite state under Assad control.

• It would give the Kurds something to continue to fight for, and would show the U.S. was firmly behind its staunchest and most effective ally against ISIS. Right now, the world doesn’t believe the U.S. can be trusted.
• It would be unsettling to the Iranians, since Iran has a significant Kurdish population; only a positive.
• Turkey would hate it. Turkey might require us to close our air bases in Turkey (that said, some analysts assert that the air bases are no longer strategic).  Such a step – if a careful assessment is made that U.S. defenses can be maintained without the air bases — may be worth the price:  President Erdogan has made himself a de facto dictator, abusing his people’s rights; Turkey has established too warm a relationship with Russia and Iran to be considered a reliable NATO ally; Turkey has condoned the beating of American protesters by Mr. Erdogan’s body guards when he visited the U.S.; Turkey has allegedly conspired with Michael Flynn for a kidnapping of Fethullah Gulan on American soil.  Turkey is, at best, a neutral in the U.S. struggle with Russia and Iran.  It should be treated that way.
• Concededly, Iraq would hate it for giving strength to its Kurdistan regional government. Admittedly a factor that weighs against the move; some accommodation to the Iraqis would need to be made.
• The Saudis and the other Gulf States would presumably welcome such a move, given the creation of another Sunni state to align against Iran.
• Ironically, President Assad might favor such a move if it meant that he was able to safely remain in power without the concern that the U.S. would any longer try to have him deposed. (Admittedly, he might well feel that given the way events have unfolded, there is no need to give up any of his country.)

 

10. It’s tempting to suggest calling for the establishment of a “Safe Zone” for the Syrian people, but a number of authorities indicate they’re hard to establish, hard to maintain, and sometimes become military targets. Unless there was true support from Russia – which, based upon the record, there is no reason to expect – such might tempt, rather than dissuade, Mr. Assad from further attacks on his own people.

Mr. Trump has shown himself willing to shuffle the deck; unfortunately, he’s also shown an affinity for strong men.  Watching the way Messrs. Putin and Erdogan have cozied up to Mr. Rouhani of Iran and to each other has hopefully taught the President that in the final analysis, friendship means nothing in foreign policy and that foreign leaders are like boys in the playground — will push their advantage until they face resistance.  The above suggestions certainly come with their own dangers; at the same time, limiting ourselves to military approaches in Syria also has significant risk in a venue where we have less strength and few effective options.