If I understand the reporting correctly, the decision actually looming for President Trump on May 12 is a procedural one:  whether to continue waivers of some of the U.S. sanctions on Iran effected as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the actual title of the agreement limiting Iranian nuclear activity) (the “JCPOA”).  Although there may be a question whether the U.S. will, from a technical standpoint, actually be withdrawing from the JCPOA if the President allows the waivers to lapse, Iran is clearly indicating that that it will deem any reinstitution of sanctions to be a violation of the arrangement, and that it will be free to renew the nuclear-related activity from which it has apparently abstained in accordance with the terms of the deal.

Whether the JCPOA is a “good deal” or a “bad deal” will be debated for decades to come.  I absolutely lack the acumen to venture a reasoned opinion, although it did seem to me a bit Pollyannaish to think that Iran, with a heritage dating back to the Persian Empire, a tradition of seeking influence beyond its borders, and a current established record of state-sponsored terrorism, would mellow sufficiently during the operative term of the arrangement such that it wouldn’t take the steps necessary to become a major nuclear threat as the restrictions wore off.  More importantly, two Americans who have my deepest respect in the realm of foreign affairs – Henry Kissinger and John McCain — expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of the deal before it was executed.

That said, all reports indicate that the international inspectors charged with monitoring Iran’s JCPOA compliance currently consider Iran to be in compliance.  Absent any evidence that Iran has violated the terms of the JCPOA, I would assert that it will be the gravest of errors if the President takes actions that result in the degradation or dissolution of the agreement.  Although commentators supporting the arrangement have come up with a raft of strategic and practical considerations why a de facto withdrawal from the deal is bad for the U.S., my basis is more fundamental:  Good deal or bad, we agreed to it.  It doesn’t matter, in this context, if we should have held out for permanent prohibitions on Iran’s nuclear-related activities, if Iran has types of non-nuclear weapons we consider significant threats, or if Iran is engaging in behaviors we don’t like, etc., etc., etc.  While we should move aggressively through other means to thwart Iran’s untoward activities outside the scope of the JCPOA, if Iran is sticking to the terms of the JCPOA, we should.  We gave our word.  It’s that simple.

All that can be said is … Vive la France …

As the primary players appear to be moving forward rapidly toward peace talks on the Korean Peninsula, it certainly appears that the President’s “crazy man” approach to the issue has been a primary motivator driving the North and South toward some sort of reconciliation.  It has been reported that the two Koreas may be open to a treaty to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

It seems a tenable assumption that in addition to the overriding desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust, the South has been driven to seek a greater level of reconciliation with the North due to a concern that the U.S. may not be as committed to defending it as it has been since the 1950’s, while the North has been prodded toward a more conciliatory stance by China – its main benefactor, without whom the regime would seemingly quickly perish – because China doesn’t want its current policies for extending its territorial, financial, and military reach thwarted or even impeded by any U.S. steps that might be taken in response to aggressive provocations by the North.

While any agreement that reduces tensions and the current North Korean nuclear threat is certainly to be lauded in the short run, the details of any pact will determine whether the arrangement is favorable for South Korean, Japanese, and American interests in the long run – i.e., over the next 25 years.

Some commentators assert that what both the Chinese and North Korean regimes have feared since the signing of the armistice is that the democratic and capitalist norms that have flourished in South Korea over the last 60 years would eventually sprout sympathetic movements in in the North, ultimately causing the toppling of the Kim regime and resulting in a united, free, democratic, capitalistic nation on China’s border.  It has occurred to me – a notion that as likely as not is all haywire – that President Xi might have a number of strategic reasons why he would be strongly encouraging the North to be forthcoming in the talks, and sending what signals of sympathy and conciliation he could to the South to facilitate a pact which provided assurance to all sides and enable all sides to save face.  I have wondered whether he might not be reasoning as follows:

First, an agreement would cool off the U.S., and cause the U.S. to shift its attention out of his back yard at a time when it still has the means to effectively serve as a counterweight to China’s influence in Asia if it so chooses.  He could conclude, based the recent transpiring of events, that every year that passes will probably make the U.S., both due to obviously increasingly constrained resources and an apparently diminishing resolve to be the world’s policeman, less willing and able to contest pressures China might ultimately wish to exert on South Korea.

Second, by using his influence with Chairman Kim to enable President Trump to claim some level of victory in his talks with Mr. Kim, Mr. Xi could — if he deftly positioned his desires as a tacit if not explicit quid pro quo – cause the U.S. to lighten up on any potential trade protection measures that will stifle the Chinese economy at a time when China is still significantly reliant on U.S. monetary policy, trade, and stability, and also cause the U.S. to continue to refrain from engaging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or like trade arrangements in the Asian theater, thereby enabling China to further fill the economic vacuum created by America’s withdrawal from TPP.

Third, it would provide him time to determine how to deal with Mr. Kim, who is clearly an irritant to China as well as to the West.  Commentators regularly assert that China and Mr. Xi support the Kim regime because they fear the instability that could result in the North from the fall of the regime.  Assuming that accurately reflects Mr. Xi’s current thinking, no one likes an erratic irritant; Mr. Xi might believe that given sufficient time, steps could be taken that would enable China to rid itself of an irritant without creating instability in the North.

Finally, contrary to China’s reported decades-long fears that South Korea’s liberal democracy and free market norms might sweep north, Mr. Xi might be determining that enabling the West to transfer its attention from the Korean Peninsula by defusing current tensions might, in the coming decades, afford China the opportunity to quietly and gradually obtain influence over the entire Korean Peninsula.  As I’ve indicated when making Noise before, I have been very struck by Richard Haass’ observation, in A World in Disarray, that in “economic, military, and diplomatic interactions,” “proximity counts [my emphasis].”  South Korea relies on exports for half of its growth, and China is its largest export partner (25%).  Although there is the argument that currently, China would hurt its own economy if it sought to bring significant pressure on South Korea, it seems more likely than not that over the coming years and decades, the relative weight of China’s influence on Seoul will grow – perhaps enabling it to persuade Seoul to abandon the THAAD defense missile system, to request the withdrawal of American troops, to give China a voice in its government, etc., etc.

Which, at long last, leads to the title of this post.  While the musings set forth here can be readily dismissed as far-fetched ramblings, one might consider how firmly Hong Kong’s liberal democratic norms stand today as compared to the day in 1997 when China assumed administration of Hong Kong.  Why wouldn’t one expect in the coming decades that China — unless effectively checked by the U.S. — will gradually exert economic and veiled military pressure on South Korea as it has with Hong Kong?

It behooves U.S. and South Korean policymakers to take great care with the details of any understanding negotiated in the coming months.

If I were a Senator, I’d vote to confirm Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State.  My main reason would be a procedural one:  as with Supreme Court Justices, I believe that any nominee of the President to a senior Administration post should be confirmed, subject to two criteria:  whether the candidate is objectively qualified for the position; and the absence of any other objective disqualifying factors (prior criminal conviction, demonstrable drug abuse problem, etc.).  The nominee’s subjective leanings – e.g., that s/he is too soft or too hardline in foreign policy – shouldn’t, in my view, be part of the assessment. 

Although many may not care for Mr. Pompeo’s stated positions on Iran and North Korea, his experience on the Congressional Intelligence Committee and at the CIA have made him arguably qualified to serve as Secretary of State.  I have not seen reference to anything that would constitute “other objective disqualifying factors” in the context I used the phrase above.  He has the confidence of the President – perhaps the most important subjective criteria to serve successfully as Secretary. 

Mr. Pompeo’s participation in the North Korea negotiations has, whether by accident or design on the President’s part, strengthened the case for his confirmation.  He has seemingly established some ability to communicate with Mr. Kim.  His expressed hardline stances perhaps give him more credibility than another diplomat considered more restrained.  Finally — although I have concerns that the outcome of the negotiations will not be in the long-term best interest of the United States (Noise to be saved for another day’s post) – since Mr. Pompeo is a central player for us in Korea negotiations now clearly underway, it would in my view be a mistake to undermine Mr. Pompeo by rejecting his nomination.

President Trump’s outrage for the children that have been gassed by the Syrian regime during the Syrian civil war should be lauded by all Americans.  That said, since the last several years’ actions and inactions of the current and prior U.S. administrations have served to significantly reduce the value of the cards we have to play in this venue, hopefully policymakers will consider whether a sole focus on military options may be too narrow and predictable.

Bashar Al-Assad is a hollow man, propped up by Russia and Iran for their own purposes.  Since Turkey has also engaged in the conflict more as an ally of Russia and Iran than of the U.S., it could also be helpful to U.S. interests if it suffers repercussions for its forays.  We might consider broadening our approach to give the Russians, the Iranians, and the Turks something more to think about, lessening their focus on their collaboration protecting Mr. Assad, including the following:

1. Russia’s strategic interests are on its European border, not in the Middle East. Issue a ringing commitment to NATO.  It will reassure our NATO allies, and make Mr. Putin aware that he has challenges in his own neighborhood.

 

2. Put more than talk behind our support of Ukraine. After quiet consultation with Congress – and with the U.K. and France if they would collaborate — the Administration should execute a codicil to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances pledging military assistance to Ukraine in the event its borders are infringed, and place a symbolic U.S. force at the Ukraine-Russia border.

 

3. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that Russian markets have been “rattled” by the Administration’s orders to U.S. investors to sell all holdings in companies related to a named Russian oligarch. Impose like targeted U.S. sanctions on other Russian oligarchs and institutions tied to President Putin, doing our best to avoid measures that will directly impact the Russian people.

 

4. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Russia – immediately and constantly. (We should be already doing this, but reportedly, we aren’t.)

 

5. As to Iran, the U.S. should impose whatever economic sanctions on Iranian officials it hasn’t already – again, to the extent that such sanctions will not directly impact the Iranian people.

 

6. Get support from EU nations to buttress our sanctions on Iran.  I note that the Journal reported in mid-March that EU countries – admittedly as a result of the President’s calls to exit the Iranian nuclear deal and for sanctions against Iranian ballistic missile and other activities – were hoping to forestall the U.S. exit by exploring measures to strengthen the EU’s sanctions against Iran. Although I entirely disagree with the President’s spoken intent to abandon the nuclear deal, he again needs to be given credit:  his “crazy man” approach appears to have borne fruit.  The U.S. should harvest the leverage the President has created by quietly indicating that it will continue in the nuclear deal – at least for a specified period — if the EU imposes an aggressive set of sanctions on Iran specified by U.S.

 

7. Engage in aggressive cyber warfare against Iran – immediately and constantly. (This, we probably are already doing.)

 

8. As to Turkey, double the number of U.S. troops assisting our Kurdish allies in the region of Syria in which the YPG is currently fighting ISIS on behalf of the alleged coalition. Inform the Turkish government that any military action against the YPG that results in American casualties will be dealt with severely.

 

9. Call for dividing Syria into separate states, as was done in Bosnia: an independent Kurdish state – perhaps linked to the Kurdistan region in Iraq; a independent Sunni state (75% of Syrians are Sunni); and an Alawite state under Assad control.

• It would give the Kurds something to continue to fight for, and would show the U.S. was firmly behind its staunchest and most effective ally against ISIS. Right now, the world doesn’t believe the U.S. can be trusted.
• It would be unsettling to the Iranians, since Iran has a significant Kurdish population; only a positive.
• Turkey would hate it. Turkey might require us to close our air bases in Turkey (that said, some analysts assert that the air bases are no longer strategic).  Such a step – if a careful assessment is made that U.S. defenses can be maintained without the air bases — may be worth the price:  President Erdogan has made himself a de facto dictator, abusing his people’s rights; Turkey has established too warm a relationship with Russia and Iran to be considered a reliable NATO ally; Turkey has condoned the beating of American protesters by Mr. Erdogan’s body guards when he visited the U.S.; Turkey has allegedly conspired with Michael Flynn for a kidnapping of Fethullah Gulan on American soil.  Turkey is, at best, a neutral in the U.S. struggle with Russia and Iran.  It should be treated that way.
• Concededly, Iraq would hate it for giving strength to its Kurdistan regional government. Admittedly a factor that weighs against the move; some accommodation to the Iraqis would need to be made.
• The Saudis and the other Gulf States would presumably welcome such a move, given the creation of another Sunni state to align against Iran.
• Ironically, President Assad might favor such a move if it meant that he was able to safely remain in power without the concern that the U.S. would any longer try to have him deposed. (Admittedly, he might well feel that given the way events have unfolded, there is no need to give up any of his country.)

 

10. It’s tempting to suggest calling for the establishment of a “Safe Zone” for the Syrian people, but a number of authorities indicate they’re hard to establish, hard to maintain, and sometimes become military targets. Unless there was true support from Russia – which, based upon the record, there is no reason to expect – such might tempt, rather than dissuade, Mr. Assad from further attacks on his own people.

Mr. Trump has shown himself willing to shuffle the deck; unfortunately, he’s also shown an affinity for strong men.  Watching the way Messrs. Putin and Erdogan have cozied up to Mr. Rouhani of Iran and to each other has hopefully taught the President that in the final analysis, friendship means nothing in foreign policy and that foreign leaders are like boys in the playground — will push their advantage until they face resistance.  The above suggestions certainly come with their own dangers; at the same time, limiting ourselves to military approaches in Syria also has significant risk in a venue where we have less strength and few effective options.